and wildlife apart using physical barriers; paying villagers compensation for damage done to their crops and livestock; and “internalizing the externality” such that farmers bear the costs of wildlife damage but also get control over and therefore benefits from the wildlife and so have an interest in their conservation. Giving the property rights to the local community to manage the resource also provides a mechanism through which outside agencies concerned with biodiversity conservation can negotiate with the community, and through which the community can have the legal backing to protect the resource from “outsiders” and thus derive the benefits (MA, 2005).

The use of physical barriers around protected areas is used in some specific areas but tends to be highly costly, not always effective, and can have negative impacts on the ecological equilibrium of a region, including interfering with natural migration routes. An alternative, less costly barrier approach is for individual households to fence their homesteads, putting their livestock in corrals overnight (Distefano, 2005). Whether households would adopt corralling depends on the costs, perceived benefits and cultural norms.

Financial compensation tends to be highly contentious, rarely effective in practice and depends on external funds. In theory there are compensation schemes in Kenya, but no payouts have been made since 1989 and the official compensation rates are insufficient to cover most costs of damage by wildlife (Distefano, 2005). Paying compensation for wildlife damage does not guarantee that wildlife will be optimally managed, that farmers will refrain from killing wild animals, or that farmers will be honest about the extent of damage by wildlife, and so in tandem with such payments are required conservation incentives and a monitoring and enforcement system (Wells, 1992; MA, 2005).

Schemes that pay compensation or involve communities in wildlife protection are likely to be undermined where property rights are weak. Without strong property rights, farming communities are unable to restrict external access to wildlife; and have little incentive to adopt long-term strategies to manage these resources (MA, 2005). For example, in the francophone territories in West Africa, forest residents have no authority and hence no ability to restrict the exploitation of game by “outside hunters” (Bowen-Jones et al., 2002; MA, 2005) and so any schemes to compensate the local community for wildlife protection would be rendered ineffective.

Devolving responsibility and control over wildlife is being undertaken in a number of countries. In Ghana, encouraging local community management of wildlife resources has involved the proposal that the government Wildlife Division devolve property rights over wildlife to certain local communities, thereby providing an incentive for the community to conserve and manage the natural resource base as the local community now has hunting rights to the wildlife, also an important source of animal protein in their diet (MA, 2005). It is too early to determine whether or not this approach has been a success in terms of reducing farmer-wildlife conflict and improving wildlife numbers and diversity. In Tanzania, community wildlife management strategies feature in the 1998 Wildlife Policy in which locals are granted usufruct rights to the wildlife (Nelson, 2007). In practice, however, there appear to be political and institutional conflicts over

the control of the resources, in part a consequence of poorly implemented devolution processes (Nelson, 2007).

The most successful and well-documented cases with respect to improving wildlife conservation and reducing conflict with farmers in SSA come from Southern Africa, particularly the dry savanna zone, where property rights over wildlife are well-defined and enforced and where the tenurial context is much more favorable (MA, 2005). The best known is CAMPFIRE, Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources, in Zimbabwe. In South Africa, animal viewing and hunting tourism has resulted in 18% of farmland being converted into game ranches that allow local people to capture non-local values (Heal, 2002; MA, 2005). Wildlife conservation has also increased on the remaining farmland because farmers have property rights to capture wild animals found on their land and sell them to game ranches rather than kill them (Heal, 2002; MA, 2005).

Two key lessons emerge from the literature. Without well-defined and enforced property rights, it is difficult to implement sustainable strategies for the conservation of wildlife where there are natural conflicts between wildlife
and livestock and crops. This implies that community-based wildlife management cannot be introduced as a project or as part of a technical assistance package, but needs to be embedded in institutions that build local rights to control and access nearby resources (Nelson, 2007). Further, villagers are unlikely to have the incentive to be involved in community- based schemes unless the wildlife are sufficiently valuable or the villagers are otherwise compensated. In East and Southern Africa there are many charismatic wildlife species that have sufficient value to outsiders, whether for tourism or so-called “trophy hunting.”

The challenges are greater in West and Central Africa where these outside sources of revenue are not available. Indeed, wildlife management options that have proven successful in the savannahs of East and Southern Africa may not be applicable in West and Central Africa (Bowen-Jones et al., 2002). Finally, in situations where villagers’ incentives cannot be aligned with conserving key species, and for species where even low levels of off-take may cause loss of populations (most likely for large-bodied charismatic species such as gorilla and elephant), such that even “by-catch” is a problem, separation of people and wildlife and strict enforcement may be the only option (Bowen-Jones et al., 2002).

5.7 Forests and Agroforestry
Rural populations rely heavily on forest resources that can complement or substitute for food and income from agriculture. Large and small-scale enterprises extract timber and local communities collect both timber and non-timber forest products (NTFPs), including building materials, fuelwood, charcoal, bushmeat, fruits and vegetables, of which fuelwood is particularly important in SSA. Playing multiple roles, forests also provide ecosystem services and support the conservation of biodiversity.

Agroforestry has the potential to offer wealth-creating opportunities for individual households and communities and also provide alternative products from natural forests, and so its development has the potential to take the pressure