264 | North America and Europe (NAE) Report

joint initiative of an environmental NGO (the Rainforest Alliance) and industry. The effectiveness of those certifica­tion schemes is still questioned: multiplicity of labels creates confusion (still a battle among certifiers); chain of custody controls are unclear in some cases (example of PEFC); la­bels are used as market instruments more than tools pro­moting sustainability; and labels are unknown to customers (Burger et al., 2005). But the changes in the forest sector are promising, because the introduction of certification schemes has boosted both the participation among actors and the development of a more accountable expertise. An increas­ing share of the wood products on the market is certified through these various schemes (Rametsteiner, 2000).
     National Forest Programs (NFPs): An NFP is a strategic document, established within a timeframe of 10-15 years and provides the rationale and directive for public action in the forest sector. It is established through a formal partici­patory process associating the stakeholders and the public and gives guidance on the establishment of partnerships and share of responsibilities in carrying out the activities. This new way of formulating forest strategies has replaced the conventional, technical top-down mode of planning of the forest administration (Glück et al., 1999; COST E19, 2000). The NFPs are based on several elements: participation—all stakeholders and sometimes the public are strongly invited to be involved in the designing and implementation of forest activities (FAO/ECE/ILO, 2000, 2003; IUCN, 2001); links across sectors—programming of forest activities is elabo­rated in connection with other sectors, especially environ­ment and land use (Tikkanen et al., 2002); coordination between various levels of governance to ensure compre­hension between international, national and local actions (Niskanen and Väyrynen, 1999; Slee and Wiersum, 2001); accountable expertise from various sources and subject to public debate; and iterative processes to promote adaptive management based on collaborative learning.
     During the last 10 years, there has been a significant increase of NFPs, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, as this was an informal requirement before becoming inte­grated within the European Union (Glück and Humphreys, 2002; Glück et al., 2003). As for Western European coun­tries, the NFPs elaborated are more formal documents, ex­cept in Finland and Scotland (Gislerud and Neven, 2002; Humphreys, 2004). In the US, where decision makers are more results, than process-oriented, NFPs are not yet part of the culture.
     Although those changes are significant in a very tradi­tional sphere such as the forestry sector, all the characteristics of these new modes of governance and management are far from being present in all national frameworks: participation is used as an alibi, cross-sector approaches are advocated only when they reinforce the sector and the accountability of expertise is diverted by the conventional experts (Buttoud et al., 2004).

6.5 Funding Investments in Research and Development (R&D) for Agriculture
Research and Development are key elements of technology change. R&D needs and priorities will vary among plau­sible futures. From an investment viewpoint, decisions are

 

required on how much to spend on R&D, who should pay for it, who should do it and on issues of governance.

6.5.1  Spending on R&D
Spending on R&D is worthwhile if it gives a satisfactory return in absolute terms (extra benefits are greater than or equal to extra costs) and relative to other investment op­portunities. The benefits of R&D are multiple and diverse, some being immediate and others long term. Some benefits of agricultural R&D accrue directly and exclusively to the users of research products (private benefits/goods) while others generate indirect benefits for society at large (public benefits/goods). Investment in crop genetics, for example, can deliver private benefits to farmers who use the research products, as well as public benefits associated with increased food security. Extra costs include the costs of resources committed to R&D activities. They may also include public costs associated, for example, with unwanted social or envi­ronmental side effects.
     Methodologies to evaluate investments in R&D are available but there are theoretical and practical challenges (Alston et al., 1995). Previous investments in agricultural R&D in NAE have shown relatively high rates of return (Al­ston et al., 1999, 2000, 2001; Thirtle, 1999, 2003; ADAS, 2002; Marra et al., 2002; Sylvester-Bradley and Wiseman, 2005), perhaps suggesting a degree of under-investment. However, some estimates are liable to errors associated with overestimation, double counting, over-attribution of benefits to individual R&D programs (Alston et al., 2001) and possible omission of some of the negative social and environmental effects of improvements in productivity due to use of R&D products (Julian and Pardey, 2001; Barnes, 2002; Koeijer et al., 2002). In some cases, R&D may not have been the best way of achieving the desired outcome.

6.5.2 Paying for agricultural R&D
Generally, the criteria for payment is that the beneficiary pays, moderated by ability to pay. Broadly, providers of R&D products should be remunerated by those who derive private benefits from their use. In this way, the research­ers recover their costs and are given incentives to invest in R&D. Where potential users of R&D products cannot af­ford to pay and yet it is considered that overall social wel­fare is enhanced if they use R&D products, there may be a case for public funding. This could be to help finance the R&D process or the acquisition of research products by us­ers. Here, government intervention is addressing the failure of R&D markets to deliver a socially optimum R&D spend. Some R&D may also provide public goods by reducing the negative externalities of agriculture such as diffuse pollu­tion; in this case, it is sometimes questionable whether re­medial R&D of this kind constitutes the most economically efficient approach: other policy interventions might be bet­ter, including removing incentives which cause the externali­ties in the first place, such as production subsidies.
     Definitions of public goods associated with agricultural R&D vary over time and space, as does the justification for government funding. In postwar Europe, food production to feed nations was regarded as a public good, justifying major commitments of public funds for crop, livestock and