Previous | Return to table of contents | Search Reports | Next |
« Back to weltagrarbericht.de |
Looking into the Future for Knowledge, Science and Technology and AKST | 197
better regulators than policies. The consequent "laissez-faire" role of the government in the management of the national economy (Alston et al., 1998) led to budget cuts and to the protection of space for large private companies to act through regulations, e.g., pesticide regulations and IPR (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). Trade liberalization contributed to giving more voice to transnational companies. Advances in genetics and intentional research policy (Alston et al., 1998) enhanced control by the private sector. The failure of public AKST to serve all the target groups might have left empty niches for private companies too. These developments and the imposition of more targets for low-income countries as a precondition for support (e.g., the increase of restricted funding for CGIAR; World Bank, 2003) left more room for NAE policies after WWII also beyond NAE. The growing position of NGOs in AKST since the 1970s was a reaction to negative externalities, which over and above the increased role of agri-business, again contributed to short -termism and competitive grants. The re-emergence of longer term and bigger programs was fostered by strife for governmental efficiency. A paradigm of "new public management" increased stakeholder participation in the 1990s: no more, or less, government, but better government, implying more enlightened regulation, improved service delivery, devolution of responsibility, openness, transparency, accountability and partnership (OECD, 1999). 5.5.3.2 Uncertainties of the future Privatization. Public goods, the poor and hungry, and rural livelihoods are target groups with the least voice on the market at present, and the private sector is led by markets. Markets can be directed to work for the social optimum through internalization of externalities, i.e., including the negative and positive externalities, in prices. Instruments include penalties (Jackson, 2005), reallocation of all taxes, subsidies and incentives, and institutional and participatory mechanisms (Pretty et al., 2001). Regulation can be used to set limitations. Integration of perspectives. Access, control and distribution of AKST does not only depend on who pays, they also depend on the perspectives and competences represented in AKST processes. There is evidence of reduced efficiency due to excessive introduction of competition and short-term thinking in management of formal public science and development structures (Huffman and Just, 2000). The risks of short-term thinking are especially serious with regard to |
|
learning-intensive integrated approaches and sustainability objectives which have an inherent long-term perspective. Will time-consuming and learning-intensive integration win the fight for paradigm shift or become impossible in a context of potentially declining resources and growing competition based on expert values, disciplinary quality and merit criteria? Control by beneficiaries: The perspectives of solvent, large-scale industry might steadily be given more emphasis in the knowledge networks if public funding declines and if there are no new creative solutions to diversify perspectives. Mul-tifunctionality of agricultural production and diversification of marketing channels and actor networks could decrease dependence on one market and thus give farmers and the supply chain a better position to negotiate with other actors on the market. Locally-oriented AKST might require less public support to achieve influence and outcomes equal to that of globally-oriented AKST. Dissemination of information. In a situation of increasing transfer of control from political decision-makers to the market, adequate, accessible market information is essential. Well-informed choices by consumers and other food system actors through education of "food competent citizens" is a precondition for promoting D&S goals through consumer choices. Appropriate standards and price premiums create incentives. The option of different consumer segments to influence on the market is not equal, but depends on their purchase power. In addition to economic barriers there are social and psychological barriers for consumption (Jackson, 2005). 5.5.3.3 Consequences for AKST |
Previous | Return to table of contents | Search Reports | Next |
« Back to weltagrarbericht.de |