by the high incidence of involuntary pesticide poisonings among farmers and farm workers through occupational exposure (Holl et al., 1990; Wesseling et al., 1993, 1997, 2002; Antle et al., 1998; Cole et al., 2002). Other drivers were state authorities' recognition of the high cost of pesticide purchase for poorer farmers and resulting problems of indebtedness (Van Huis and Meerman, 1997); the potential of new markets spurred by consumer demand for pesticide-free produce both in the North (IFOAM, 2003; Ton, 2003; Martinez-Torres, 2006) and in countries with growing middle class populations (e.g., Thailand, China, India); export requirements of Maximum Residue Limits; and international attention to issues such as pollution of drinking water, human rights to a safe home and workplace and biodiversity loss.

Impacts of IPM paradigm. IPM can deliver effective crop protection and pesticide reduction without yield loss (Heong and Escalada, 1998; Mangan and Mangan, 1998; Barzman and Desilles, 2002; Eveleens, 2004). The yield advantages of IPM have been particularly strong in the South and thus have significant policy implications for food security in developing countries (Pretty, 1999; Pretty, 2002, Pretty et al., 2003). The community-wide economic, social, health and environmental benefits of farmer-participatory ecologicallybased IPM have been widely documented (Dilts, 1999; Pontius et al., 2002; Pontius, 2003; Braun, 2006; Braun et al., 2006; Mancini, 2006; Mancini et al., 2007; van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007), including measurable improvements in neurobehavioural status as a result of reduced pesticide exposure (Cole et al., 2007). Large-scale impacts on social equity have not yet been assessed but higher household income, reduced poverty levels and significant reduction in use of WHO Class 1 highly toxic compounds have been shown in some cases (FAO, 2005a).

     Difficulties in measuring the cost-effectiveness of large scale farmer-participatory IPM has impeded wider adoption (Kelly, 2005) and raised questions about its fiscal sustainability as a national extension approach (Quizon et al., 2000; Feder, 2004ab). As acknowledged by the authors, these studies did not calculate the economic savings from reduced poisoning and pollution nor attempt to quantify non-economic benefits. An evaluation of IPM research in the CGIAR system points to the need for more comprehensive economic impact analyses that include these variables (CGIAR TAC, 2000). A recent meta-review of 35 published data sets on costs and benefits of IPM farmer field schools has meanwhile substantiated their effectiveness as an educational investment in reducing pesticide use and enabling farmers to make informed judgments about agroecosystem management (van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007).

     More widespread adoption of IPM as defined in the FAO Code of Conduct has been constrained by political, structural and institutional factors, principally

• limited capacity of extension services in both industrialized and developing countries in providing adaptive, place-based, knowledge-intensive ecological education and technical support in IPM (Blobaum, 1983; Anderson, 1990; Holl et al., 1990; Agunga, 1995; Paulson, 1995; Altieri, 1999; Norton et al., 2005; Rodriguez and Niemeyer, 2005; Touni et al., 2007);

• inadequate public sector and donor investment in IPM research and extension and poor coordination between relevant agencies (Mboob, 1994; ter Weel and van der Wulp, 1999; Touni et al., 2007);
• insufficient private sector interest in natural controls (Ehler, 2006) and widespread promotion of synthetic chemical controls by pesticide suppliers and distributors (Kroma and Flora, 2003; Touni et al., 2007);
• shifts in funding and research interests in agricultural colleges away from basic biology, entomology and taxonomy and limited resources for ecological investigations (Jennings, 1997; Pennisi, 2003; Herren et al., 2005); an incentives system that discourages multidisciplinary collaboration in pest management (Ehler, 2006); and a growing tendency, e.g., in the United States, to encourage research likely to return financial benefits to the university rather than broader benefits to the public or ecological commons (Kennedy, 2001; Berdahl, 2000; Bok, 2003; Washburn, 2005) while offering private sector partners such as the agrochemical/biotechnology industry a wider role in shaping university research and teaching priorities (Krimsky, 1999; Busch et al., 2004);
• vertical integration of ownership (FAO, 2003b) and concentration in private sector control (Vorley, 2003; DFID, 2004; Dinham, 2005) over chemical, food and agricultural systems, processes that tend to favor larger scale, input-intensive monoculture production over the biodiverse agroecosystems necessary to sustain effective performance by natural enemies; and
• inequitable distribution of risks and costs: in the absence of public sector support, farmers typically bear the upfront transaction costs and risks of conversion to pest management practices that serve the public good (Brewer et al., 2004; Ehler, 2006).

2.3.2.3 Institutional innovations and responses in pest management

Institutional innovations. FAO's paradigm-shifting work in Asia provided (1) the scientific evidence that pesticideinduced pest outbreaks could contribute to crop failures while reduction of pesticide use could improve system stability and yields (Kenmore et al., 1984); (2) empirical evidence of the positive social impacts of field-based experiential learning processes (Matteson et al., 1984; Mangan and Mangan, 1998; Ooi, 1998); and (3) the policy insight that a number of directives (e.g., ban of selected pesticides, removal of pesticide subsidies and national support for IPM) could transform the situation on the ground, as in Indonesia (Kenmore et al., 1984; Settle et al., 1996; Gallagher, 1999). Building on FAO's farmer field school methodology (http://www.farmerfieldschool .info/), participatory field-based educational processes in IPM gained strength in the 1980s (Röling and Wagemakers, 1998). These innovations in knowledge, science, technology and policy subsequently led to an institutional innovation, the establishment of the Global IPM Facility (see 2.2) and the implementation of farmer-participatory IPM across Asia, Latin America, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe (UPWARD, 2002; Jiggins et al., 2005; Luther et al., 2005; Braun et al., 2006). Plant Health Clinics (piloted in